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Eva Jakobsson
Accident investigations
A comparative perspective on societal safety in Norway 
and Sweden, 1970–2010
The topic for the article is the growing awareness of risk and safety in Norway and Sweden
during the last decades of the 20th century, and how the two Scandinavian states have
organized investigations of accidents. In many western states accident investigations have
moved from sector specific boards to permanent multi-modal commissions. This has also been
the case in the two Scandinavian states. But this comparative study reveals different paths
and varying speed towards a ‘safety culture’. The Swedish Accident Investigation Board was
established in 1990, while its Norwegian opposite partner was established in 2008. Common
for the two countries is that reorganization of investigation boards has taken place as political
actions after major accidents, rather than as a consequence of risk assessments.
Keywords accident investigations, societal safety, Scandinavian studies, 
organization of safety society
Introduction
Kings Bay 1962, Ängelholm 1964, Tretten 1975, Tuve 1977, Restaurant Monte
Carlo 1977, Kälvesta 1977, Stadshotellet in Borås 1978, Alexander Kielland
1980, Tjörnbron 1980, Kolbotn 1985, Hotel Caledonien 1986, Olof Palme 1986,
Tjernobyl 1986, Vassdalen 1986, Lerum 1987, Måbødalen 1988, Torghatten 1988,
Partnair flight 394 1989, Oskarshamn 1989, Scandinavian Star 1990, Gottröra
1991, Vasaplatsen, Göteborg 1992, Estonia 1994, Hisingen 1998, Sleipner 1999,
Åsta 2000, Linate 2001, Anna Lindh 2003, Tsunamien 2004, Gudrun 2005.
These names, places and years constitute a collective memory of tragic accidents 
and traumas in Norway and Sweden. All were sudden fatal accidents, easily 
delimited in time and space. However, their consequences have been long-lasting 
and they can be described as results of changes in society; technologically, 
organizationally or behaviourally. Perhaps we can even go so far as to describe them 
as consequences of living in prosperous, modern and egalitarian Scandinavian welfare 
societies.
We have to bear in mind, however, that during the same period many people have
been killed in road accidents, on railway lines, in their homes or by drowning without
causing the same impact neither in collective memory nor in the mass media. These
fatal accidents speak to us in a more silent way – in the noiseless distinct language of
statistics.1
The sequence of the Scandinavian traumas and all their associations have – probably 
more than anything else – contributed to our opinion of vulnerability in a modern 
welfare society. ‘Risk society’ is the frequently used metaphor for this type of society.2 
Thus the safety and risk discourses have contributed to the building up of new 
organizations. In Norway, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap) was established in 2003 and in 
Sweden three agencies (Krisberedskapsmyndigheten, Statens räddningsverk, Styrelsen för 
psykologiskt försvar) were in 2009 merged into the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
(Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap). Government reports on the subject have 
been published: ‘A vulnerable society’ (Et sårbart samfunn, 2000)3 in Norway and 
‘Safety in a new era’ (Säkerhet i en ny tid, 2001)4 in Sweden.
This gave rise to a research area on fatal accidents, which not only had the purpose 
of understanding and explaining accidents, but also to find o ut h ow t o p revent these 
accidents from recurring.5 The societal responses and visions on increased safety also 
brought forward the establishment of organizations for investigating accidents. The 
purpose of these new organizations was to investigate fatal accidents; to find out why 
they happened, why they became so fatal, and whether it had been possible for the 
societies to reduce their consequences, for example, by improving rescue coordination. 
In this article this phase of the growing awareness of risk and safety will be analysed; 
how Norway and Sweden have organized investigations of fatal accidents during the last 
decades of the 20th century.
The way in which accidents have been analyzed and explained has changed from 
placing the human factor or technical deficiencies in the foreground to adapting the 
system metaphor as a model and making man and technology interact. Investigating 
factory accidents in the 1920s, often placing the responsibility for the accident on 
individu-als on the factory floor, researchers developed a theory (‘olycksfågelteorien’) 
to define social and psychological characteristics of those who potentially could cause 
accidents. The purpose was to shut those individuals out from, for example, 
factory production or road traffic to prevent respectively factory and road accidents. 
When complex and coupled technological systems developed, such as rail and nuclear 
power systems, accident models to grasp this complexity were developed. The 
‘Normal Accident’ concept, introduced by C. Perrow in the late 1990s,6 grew out of 
such a perception. The ‘Normal Accident’ concept emphasized that accidents in 
complex systems were normal rather than atypical. However, there is still no 
common agreement on methods for accident investigations, but several competing 
methods instead. In practise often a mixture of methods and assumptions are used, 
as, for example, ‘simple-linear system model’ (‘Dominomodellen’) and ‘Complex 
Interactions’ (the Swiss Cheese Model7 introduced by J. Reason).8 According to Stoop, 
a new school of ‘safety deficiency and system change’ has developed during the 1990s. 
In this school the independence of the accident investigation boards is vital. So is the 
principle of not blaming individuals. It is the faults caused by ‘system deficiencies’, 
with an emphasis on the complexity of the social technological systems, that is focused 
on.9
In the late 20th century two major and complex socio-technological systems were 
built up in the two Scandinavian countries: in Sweden the nuclear power system and in 
Norway the offshore oil production system. In connection with these immense 
technological systems safety institutions and organizations with broad risk and safety 
expertise have been built up. They have probably contributed to new understanding – 
or system interpretation – of the causes of accidents. Thus the accident investigations 
connected to the Swedish nuclear system and to the Norwegian off-shore system 
were never integrated, nor discussed, in order to become part of the accident 
investigation boards in the two countries. An exclusive organization for control and risk 
management has been built up for these grand systems. From a societal perspective on 
accident investigations there can not of course be separate understandings of 
accidents.10
In many western states accident investigations have moved from sector specific
boards (e.g. exclusively for air, railway or maritime accidents), often with judicial
power, to broad permanent multi-modal commissions, investigating a broad range
of accidents, emphasizing that accidents are not isolated technological events, that
only are to be understood in their respective transport system contexts. The US
Transportation Safety Board, established in 1967, is often recognized as a model for this
broader approach.11 Thus the American model has inspired the development in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, while in Great Britain there are still separate investigation
boards.12
The Three Mile Island (1979) and Challenger accidents (1986) had deep impact on
the fact that accident investigations turned from interest in the solitary operative individ-
ual towards putting management, safety culture and safety climate in the foreground.13
It has also been suggested that reorganization of Scandinavian accident investigation
boards occurs as political actions taking place after major accidents, rather than as a con-
sequence of general risk assessments. Accordingly, accident investigations are organized
accidentally determined by major accidents.14
Research questions and sources
The beginning of, the development towards, and the final establishment of what came
to be independent, permanent and multi-modal accident investigations boards – in
Sweden, the Swedish Accidents Investigation Board (Statens Haverikommission), estab-
lished in 1990, and in Norway, the Accidents Investigation Board Norway (Statens
Havarikommisjon for Transport), established in 2008 – will be analysed.
In this article each country is discussed respectively and chronologically. In the 
development towards permanent multi-modal accident investigation boards, some 
topics are recurrent in varying combinations; whether the board should be permanent 
or ad hoc, whether the board should be multi-modal or not, whether blame is to be 
placed on individuals or not, whether there should be a staff with permanent positions 
or not, which combinations of expertise should be recruited, how independence can be 
accom-plished, and how recommendations and learning can be mediated. Questions 
will be asked about why special groups for accident investigation were established. 
How are investigation boards organized and how do they change over time?
Methodically this will be done by reconstructing and comparing the 
decisionmaking processes behind these organizational changes and innovations in 
Norway and Sweden. At first glance a comparison between Sweden and Norway 
reveals a great difference between the nation’s chronologies of accident investigations. 
Despite the fact that we find ideas of permanent multi-modal boards in both 
countries during the last decades of the 1900s, it took 20 years before Norway 
established a multi-modal accident investigation board for the transport sector, while 
Sweden already in 1990 established a multi-modal accident investigation board for 
the whole range of major accidents. Sweden, together with Finland, was the first 
country to institutionalize multi-modal accidents investigation boards for all kinds of 
major accidents.15 In this comparative study the societal embedment for creating 
these organizational innovations will be enlightened.
The roads towards broad multi-modal accident investigation boards in Sweden and 
Norway are analysed. How these organizations developed indicates new ways of 
understanding major accidents. Also to give attention to the times when new 
organization models were not chosen and to find the reasons for this is important in 
this article. By not describing the development as linear, history will appear 
diverse – and less evolutionistic.
The above hypothesis, on new organizational solutions as reactions to unique major
accidents, rather than results of risk analysis, is interesting. The hypothesis is put forward
by researchers who have been central actors in the research fields of risk and security
in Norway for several decades. Would the hypothesis on political action as a reaction
to major accidents be valid as an explanation for the differences between Swedish and
Norwegian accident investigation boards?
There are, however, other possible motives than political reaction to major 
accidents. One motive, already mentioned, is a change to a system-based 
understanding of major accidents, an interpretational framework that would indicate 
that one, for example, no longer distinguished a maritime accident from an air accident. 
If research – both technological and in social science – has increasingly focused on the 
‘risk society’, can this historical analysis discover any references to this growing 
research field? And – if this is the case – does this become a motive for changing the 
organization of accident investigation boards? A further problem, as mentioned earlier, 
is to find the reasons why one organizational model is preferred to other possible 
models. There must be reasons and motives for alterations as well as for status quo. 
What explicit intentions can be found?
The risk society is a central concept in the discussion around accident 
investigations. How is the risk context described on a societal level in the documents 
on new organizational solutions? How do the descriptions change over time? 
Investigating these descriptions we can reveal how they are connected and how they 
contributed to changes in the organization of accident investigation committees.
Government reports and parliamentary documents are used as primary sources. 
Some archival sources have been used. In this selection we can examine the official 
decisions and the political discourses. As a rule these documents are characterized by a 
low level of disagreement. They are often texts of few words, and clearly they are not 
part of main stream political debate. By this perspective we can pay attention to the 
intentions, but not how accident investigations have been performed. It is obvious that 
another narrative would have been presented if, for example, interviews with some 
central actors among politicians, administrators, experts or members of ad hoc as well 
as permanent accident investigations boards could have been conducted.
Sweden
The early accident investigation organizations
Aviation increased during the post-war period parallel to motor traffic. Both became
transport systems for the general public. Even if road traffic killed the highest number
of people,16 it was aviation that was most dependent on performing as a safe transport
system. One single aircraft accident made more damage to the confidence of the system
than the death toll on the roads could ever do to road traffic. Therefore it was of great
importance to build up confidence for aviation.
In
 
1957
 
new
 
aviation
 
legislation
 
was
 
passed.
 
It
 
was
 
a
 
result
 
of
 
Nordic
 
cooperation
 
and
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
became
 
to
 
a
 
large
 
degree
 
common
 
for
 
the
 
Nordic
 
countries.
 
In
 
these
 
laws
 
one
 
could
 
for
 
the
 
first
 
time
 
find
 
rules
 
on
 
how
 
to
 
conduct
 
accident
 
investigations
 
of
 
civilian
 
air
 
accidents.
 
The
 
‘starting
 
shot’
 
for
 
a
 
development
 
towards
 
a
 
centralized
 
organization
 
for
 
accident
 
investigations
 
is
 
said
 
to
 
have
 
been
 
fired
 
in
 
1959,
 
when
 
the
 
independence
 
of
 
the
 
internal
 
military
 
accident
 
investigations
 
was
 
called
 
into
 
question
 
by
 
the
 
military
 
ombudsman
 
(militieombudsmannen).
 
The
 
criticism
 
was
 
perceived
 
as
 
a
 
question
 
about
 
objectivity
 
and
 
a
 
problem
 
of
 
efficiency,
 
emphasizing
 
that
 
no
 
one
 
should
 
investi-gate
 
one’s
 
own
 
operations.
 
The
 
fact
 
that
 
the
 
investigations
 
were
 
pursued
 
by
 
employees
 
as
 
extra
 
work
 
on
 
top
 
of
 
their
 
daily
 
work
 
was
 
called
 
into
 
question.17
 
Consequently
 
the
 
Swedish
 
Air
 
Force
 
established
 
its
 
own
 
accident
 
investigating
 
board
 
in
 
1966,
 
consisting
 
of
 
permanent
 
members
 
with
 
a
 
specific
 
mandate
 
to
 
investigate
 
military
 
aviation
 
accidents.18
In
 
the
 
middle
 
of
 
the
 
1970s
 
a
 
government
 
committee
 
proposed
 
the
 
establishment
 
of
 a
 
joint
 
accident
 
investigation
 
board
 
for
 
civilian
 
as
 
well
 
as
 
military
 
flights
 
–
 
or
 
‘a
 
central
 authority
 
for
 
investigating
 
major
 
civilian
 
and
 
military
 
aviation
 
accidents’.
 
The
 
aim
 
for
 
its
 activities
 
was
 
to
 
prevent
 
reappearance
 
of
 
identical
 
accidents.
 
As
 
we
 
have
 
seen,
 
there
 
had
 been
 
criticism
 
against
 
many
 
investigations
 
carried
 
out
 
as
 
spare-time
 
occupation
 
and
 
con-
sequently
 
the
 
investigations
 
were
 
dependent
 
on
 
the
 
individual’s
 
‘personal
 
interest
 
and
 desire
 
to
 
take
 
on
 
extra
 
assignment’.
 
Furthermore,
 
those
 
who
 
investigated
 
were
 
often
 
the
 same
 
individuals
 
that
 
were
 
to
 
be
 
investigated.
 
To
 
meet
 
this
 
criticism
 
the
 
Swedish
 government
 
established
 
the
 
Swedish
 
Accident
 
Investigation
 
Board
 
(Statens
 Haverikommission,
 
SHK)
 
in
 
1978,
 
to
 
investigate
 
aircraft
 
accidents,
 
civilian
 
as
 
well
 
as
 military.
 
The
 
need
 
for
 
effective
 
accident
 
investigation
 
was,
 
according
 
to
 
the
 government,
 
due
 
to
 
the
 
expansion
 
in
 
aviation
 
and
 
the
 
technological
 
development
 
during
 the
 
preceeding
 
20
 
years.
 
The
 
government
 
wrote:
 
‘The
 
most
 
important
 
object
 
for
 
the
 accident
 
investigation
 
must
 
be
 
to
 
explain
 
the
 
causal
 
connection
 
and
 
possible
 
shortages
 in
 
the
 
total
 
safety
 
system’.
 
Another
 
way
 
to
 
emphasize
 
the
 
system
 
level
 
of
 
the
 investigations
 
was
 
not
 
to
 
prioritize
 
the
 
search
 
for
 
someone
 
to
 
blame
 
for
 
the
 
accident.
 Aviation
 
safety
 
was
 
instead
 
best
 
served
 
if
 
one
 
could
 
find
 
out
 
‘why
 
a
 
procedure
 
was
 organized
 
in
 
such
 
a
 
manner
 
that
 
a
 
human
 
mistake
 
could
 
cause
 
an
 
accident,
 
and
 
propose
 measures
 
that
 
contributed
 
to
 
avoiding
 
that
 
the
 
same
 
event
 
would
 
happen
 
again’.
 
An
 independent
 
permanent
 
accident
 
investigation
 
institution
 
would,
 
according
 
to
 
the
 government,
 
satisfy
 
demand,
 
effectiveness
 
as
 
well
 
as
 
objectivity.
 
The
 
arguments
 
were
 strengthened
 
by
 
referring
 
to
 
an
 
international
 
trend
 
towards
 
permanent
 
investigation
 boards,
 
independent
 
from
 
safety
 
authorities.
 
From
 
these
 
intentions
 
and
 
expectations
 
one
 can
 
discern
 
a
 
system
 
understanding,
 
and
 
the
 
position
 
that
 
accident
 
investigations
 
should
 be
 
contextualized
 
and
 
professionalized.19
The new SHK was lead by a director-general with background as a judge and
four accident investigators with background in aircraft operational or technological
knowledge and experience.20
From 1958 on, the problem of safety control authorities performing maritime 
accident investigations had been discussed.21 The 1963 maritime law committee 
proposed a separate board for investigating major maritime accidents. And since 1967, 
the Swedish Maritime Accident Investigation Board (Sjöfartens haverikommission) has 
been in opera-tion, parallel to the Maritime Inquiry Institute (Sjöförklaringsinstitutet). 
However, it has been labelled as ‘quasi-permanent’, as it did not convene until it was 
given permanent members in the middle of the 1970s.22
It was the trade unions – the Swedish Ship Officers’ Association (Svenska fartygsbe-
fälsföreningen) and the Swedish Seamen Association (Svenska sjöfolksförbundet) – who had
spoken up for a permanent maritime accident investigation board. In that discussion it
was claimed that ‘the fast technological development [ . . . ] has little by little increased
the demands on the reliability and effectiveness of the total maritime systems safety’.
Preferably this would be done by a permanent authority, not an ad hoc committee, which
should be independent from safety authorities and the Maritime Inquiry Institute.23
The result was that in the late 1980s there were three parallel organs for 
investigating maritime accidents; the Maritime Inquiry Institute, the Swedish Maritime 
Accident Investigation Board and the Swedish Maritime Administration 
(Sjöfartsverket).24
The State Catastrophe Board – an interlude and a model
‘The committee (Kn 1981:02) for investigation of major accidents’ (Kommitten
(Kn 1981:02) för undersökning av allvarliga olyckhändelser), the committee with the clumsy
name, was established in 1981. Usually it was named the State Catastrophe Board (Statens
katastrofkommission). During the years before its establishment, Sweden had been deeply
shaken by several major accidents; the land slide in Tuve in 1977, the fires in the Monte
Carlo Restaurant in 1977 and at a hotel in Borås city in 1978.
As these accidents could not be investigated by the newly set up SHK, because it
only handled aircraft accidents, the idea of a committee for investigating major accidents
was put forward by trade unions that had been affected by these accidents.25 Let us look
closer at the arguments used for establishing this innovation in investigating accidents.
In the preparatory works the argumentation took its preliminary starting point in 
a description of a new society: ‘Societal development is characterized ... by the fact 
that many activities become more and more complex. New substances, materials and 
activities – often having new and unknown accident risks – are constantly being 
developed. The number of accidents as well as the damage costs is on the increase’. 
Damage by fires had been doubled during the preceding decades. Many individuals 
had been mortally wounded in accidents ‘relatively unknown in Sweden’. There were 
no organizations at hand for investigating this category of grave accidents, and it created 
a situation where no ‘transfer of experience’ could help understanding ‘the 
interrelations between materials, construction and human reactions’, a position that 
indicated the need for a system understanding of accidents. A new understanding of 
accidents was formulated by accentuating that learning from accidents was essential 
– there was a need for an ‘organized method to bring back results’ and one 
expected it to be much simpler ‘to work crosswise – across borders between different 
activities and accident categories and across boards for diverse specialist knowledge’.26
Sweden was at this time close to a hegemonic social democracy; the trade unions
and the government were closely linked. This meant that when the Hotel and Restaurant
Workers’ Union (Hotell- och Restauranganställdas förbund) in the autumn of 1978 wrote
to the Ministry of Local Government (Kommundepartementet) it was an act that easily
could give results. In the letter it was referred to the many hotel and restaurant fires
that had occurred both internationally as well as in Sweden. Probably it was a hotel fire
on the Greek tourist island Rhodes and a hotel fire in Amsterdam in 1977, where many
Swedes burned to death, one had in mind. Fires at the Luxor factory in Motala, the
Electrolux factory in Mariestad, and a reactor fire at the Barsebäck nuclear power plant
are explicitly mentioned in the preparatory works. In Sweden four lives were lost in
the fire at Restaurant Monte Carlo in Stockholm 1977.27 The greatest impression was
probably made by the 1978 fire at the main hotel in Borås (Stadshotellet in Borås). In the
early summer night the higher school examination celebration in the hotel ended in a
fire catastrophe causing the death of 20 young individuals. During the reconstruction of
the course of the fire one found out that with some simple measures before and during
the initial phase of the fire this tragedy could have been averted.28
The trade unions expected the information produced in such accident investigations 
to bring knowledge that did not only limit but even ended the occurrence of such major 
fires. Therefore one considered it ‘appropriate to establish a permanent state 
investigating board. Bearing the latest catastrophic fire at the main hotel in Borås in 
mind, a decision to do so is completely necessary’.29
An internal ministry committee was set up, and it proposed a new organization to
investigate major accidents. In its report, ‘Investigation of major accidents’, one even
predicted a future societal development in which a new type of accidents would occur.
Society is becoming increasingly complex and more vulnerable. New substances, 
materials and technological processes with – sometimes – new and unknown 
accident risks, are constantly developing. Society continues to be urbanized. 
Industrial production and other trades are concentrated. By increased large-scale 
production plants and different means of transportation achieve more and more 
capacity. The consequences of every major accident are increasing.30
A board for investigating major accidents could contribute to a continuity whereby 
investigations were not performed haphazardly. Continuity in accident investigation 
would also contribute to more systematically performed investigations and thereby 
increase the reliability of the investigation methods.31
It was stipulated, once again, that the most important objective was to prevent new 
accidents. Several categories of accidents were mentioned specifically: Fires, explosions, 
land slides, mining accidents, flooding, s torms and snow s torms, mountain accidents 
endangering people, road accidents that could have been avoided if preventive actions 
had been made, railway, tram and subway accidents, industrial accidents with injuries 
to employees, nature or environment, accidents in connection with entertainment, 
discharge of radioactive substances, chemicals and oil. Interestingly, it was proposed 
that one type of accident – nuclear power plant accidents – was not to fall under the 
jurisdiction this new accident investigations board. The new board should collaborate 
with the police, but was not to handle questions of individual responsibility or 
compensation to the individuals who had been hurt in the accident in question. The 
board should consist of a permanent staff of persons with competence in law, 
technology, fire protection and rescue service, labour inspection and healthcare.32
Except for aviation and maritime accidents, the State Catastrophe Board could
choose the accidents they wanted to investigate. But still there was no legal decree on
how these accident investigations were to be accomplished.33
The split 1980s
During the 1980s the Swedish Accident Investigation Board – the SHK, the Swedish 
Maritime Accident Investigation Board and the State Catastrophe Board worked side by 
side. The jurist Lars-Göran Malmberg has described this as a period of ‘sharp 
competition’, where all the three parties wanted to develop their own niche.34 
Therefore, both SHK and the State Catastrophe Board were evaluated in 1986. Each of 
them wanted to keep their organizations permanent – SHK even had ambitions to 
expand its operations. Speed, objectivity and effectiveness were used as words of 
prestige by both parties for defending their own existence. Surprisingly, the outcome 
of the evaluations was that the State Catastrophe Board was liquidated as it was forced 
to merge with the SHK.35 Let us look closer at how this happened.
Since it was established, the State Catastrophe Board had written 21 accident 
investigation reports. The board claimed that their reports were unique in 
comparison to the SHK reports as ‘the committee has developed its own specific 
nature’. The State Catastrophe Board also distanced itself from the SHK by 
maintaining that the SHK ‘usually was primarily specialized’ and that the SHK 
treated ‘similar questions which often are the products of short accident courses’. 
This can be interpreted as the State Catastrophe Board perceived itself as having a 
different understanding from the SHK. Their investigations had, according to the 
State Catastrophe Board, developed into so different directions ‘that they could hardly 
be coordinated by one investigating agency’. A merger was thus expected to bring 
neither rationalization nor budgetary savings.36
The investigation boards for aircraft as well as for maritime accidents were objects 
for a new departmental report in the same year, in 1986.37 The result was the 
recommendation to establish a joint organization for accident investigations in 
aviation and navigation. This should be done by abolishing the Swedish Maritime 
Accident Investigation Board, which was criticized for being too slow in finishing their 
reports.38
Like so many times before it was suggested that this new commission should work
on safety problems only, and not to search for individuals to blame. The unbiased role
of the new commission must also be underlined by its independence from safety control
authorities. In this report a new argument was introduced to strengthen its recommen-
dations, namely that the report should be written in a style that everybody who was
interested in the matter could easily understand. This would contribute to the possi-
bilities for public control.39 In the report it was claimed that aircraft accidents were of
a different character – more injuries or deaths – than navigation accidents. However,
with a good deal of premonition the report anticipated that ‘a definitive catastrophe’
was much closer in time in maritime passenger traffic than in aviation (this was still
4 years before the Scandinavian Star fire and still another 4 years would pass until the
loss of the Estonia ferry). No key argument could be found for maintaining the separate
organizations. But why was the State Catastrophe Board not included? Simply because,
as we already have demonstrated, of the resistance among its members.40
A U-turn by the Social Democrats
1986, the year of the evaluation of the accident organization investigations, was also
the year of two very dramatic catastrophes that hit Swedish society: the assassination of
Prime Minister Olof Palme and the radioactive pollution from the Tjernobyl nuclear
accident brought in by winds over Sweden. These events were of a very different nature.
At the same time they had in common their thoroughly new character; with far-reaching
psychological and natural effects, and long-lasting in the sense that the consequences
were complex – both to forecast and to repair. 1986 and the years that followed put
Swedish society and state under pressures of a kind it had not experienced before.
Two years later a new tragedy struck the Swedish society – the Måbødal Accident
(Måbødalolyckan). As it again struck school children its influence was comparable to the
Borås fire 10 years earlier. During a school bus trip to the mountainous western Norway
the bus brakes gave away in a sloping tunnel. Twelve children and four adults were killed,
18 persons were injured. Since this was a new type of accident affecting people seeking
adventurous travels both in and outside Europe, the whole situation was complicated by
the fact that the accident occurred far away from the families’ homes.
When the Social Democratic government the following year, in 1989, presented
a bill on accident investigations to the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen, it chose not to
follow the recommendations of the committees’ reports that had promoted a continu-
ation of parallel organizations. The governmental bill was radical and far-reaching, and
as previously mentioned, one of the first in the world – ‘a common practice for inves-
tigating all kinds of major accidents for security reasons, whether they take place in
aviation, in navigation, in railway traffic or in any other activity’. By this bill the gov-
ernment introduced the principle that the same practice would be valid for all kinds of
accidents; a position that was not shared by the State Catastrophe Board, as they claimed
that the current investigation committees used different investigation methods and pro-
duced reports that deviated from each other and were so fundamentally different that
any merger was impossible.41
The government emphasized that the most important motive in accident investi-
gations was to find the causes of the accidents and to be able to avoid them in the
future. This was not new – it was a mantra to be repeated over and over again. The
government claimed ‘there is a value in that major accidents regularly is investigated by
a qualified societal authority, which at the same time is independent from those who are
responsible for making regulations and control of the activities under which the accident
has happened’. In short, the government declared its acceptance of the fact that there
were some differences between SHK and the State Catastrophe Board. According to the
government these differences were not too great to be overcome. According to the gov-
ernment, it was not ‘rational’ to have parallel organizations at work. The government
also wrote that ‘for the public it must appear most natural that the same institution has
the responsibility for various types of accidents’. This task would go to the SHK. To gain
safety knowledge, it was the major accidents and those less serious, but of safety interest,
that were expected to be investigated. Most surprising, as it was by no means anticipated
in earlier reports, this new organization was to be strengthened by new legislation for
‘investigations of all major accidents and other events that are important for safety’.42 In
the parliament the bill was interpreted to be so flexible that even traffic accidents, which
one knew so little about, could be investigated by this new organization.43
A new and comprehensive legislation was passed in 1990 – Legislation (1990:712) 
on accident investigations (Lag (1990:712) om undersökning av olyckor) – whereby a 
centralized multi-modal accident investigation board was established. The SHK took 
over all assignments from the State Catastrophe Board and the Swedish Maritime 
Accident Investigation Board (the Maritime Inquiry Institute was retained). It was 
expected that a ‘uniformity in accidents investigation methods would spread itself’. 
Some international influence on the legislation can be traced. However, according to 
Lars-Göran Malmberg, it can be characterized as to be, ‘to a great part, a Swedish 
construction’.44
Later it has been claimed by Malmberg that the effectiveness aimed for in the 1990
construction, which was to create the institutional capacity to make fast reports and to
investigate the essential accidents, has not been achieved. The research board has too
few employees in relation to the tasks at hand, and the actual group of potential experts
is so small that it constitutes a threat to the objectivity of the group.45
Norway
The Norwegian tradition of ad hoc investigation
The Norwegian accident investigation committees originate from a long Norwegian 
tradition of ad hoc commissions. These ad hoc investigation commissions have their 
historical roots as early as in the political struggles during the 19th century. They 
were vehicles for examinations of a variety of social incongruities, real as well as 
alleged wrongs. The latter were convenient tools in the political power struggles 
that led to parliamentarian rule. Gradually this system of ad hoc investigation 
committees was used to examine what we label major accidents. Towards the end of 
the 19th century, ad hoc commissions developed by combining the power for 
distributing guilt for the accident and for establishing its causes, at the same time as 
they relinquished their judging func-tion. Still, ad hoc commissions, up to the 1920s, 
from time to time carried out judicial functions.
This perspective is applied in a massive comparative and empirical study by Harald
Koht on ad hoc governmental investigative commission reports in the United States and
Norway. His time line is long – from the 1820s to 2009. In his study he claims that in the
United States the system-based explanations were introduced already in the late 1800s,
while a corresponding change did not occur in Norway until in the 1960s. Koht asserts
that Norway during the early decades of the 20th century, in contrast to the United
States, was preoccupied with nation-building after its move towards independence in
1905. This remarkable lag between the breakthroughs for system levelled explanations
in the Norwegian accident reports compared to the American ones must be understood,
according to Koht, by the late breakthrough at the end of the 1940s of social sciences
in Norway. Koht describes how governmental investigative commission reports change
from blaming individuals to the present system-oriented or contextual explanations and
discusses which factors have contributed to such a change. He introduces some possible
hypotheses: the changes in political cultures where ‘equality cultures’ (likhetskulturer)
will prioritize system-based explanations, or changes in the way committees are put
together of different expertise. Koht’s conclusion is that it has made no difference if
governments were on the left or the right. This discredits, he argues, hypothesis based on
political explanations. The fact that lawyers and officers have been replaced by engineers
and social scientists in the governmental investigation committees has been significant,
according to Koht, because the latter tend to use system-oriented explanations. This can,
in turn, be explained by varying cultures at the different schools and universities where
the experts have been educated. Koht claims that by using system-based explanations
the experts have recognized that organizations are complex and thus it gives no meaning
to blame individuals.46
One particular accident report is regarded as a watershed in the history of 
Norwegian accident investigation, namely the examination after the mining accident 
in Svalbard in 1962 – the Kings Bay accident. It was in this investigation that the system 
perspective broke through in Norway. Because the investigators emphasized that the 
system had failed, the accident led to the dismissal of the responsible persons at the 
highest level, namely the government. After what then had become a political question, 
the so-called Eckhoff panel tried to establish clearer frames around the accident 
investigations by working out proposals for rules for investigative commissions. In 1975 
these proposals were incorporated in the circular (Rundskriv) G - 4 8  /75 which still 
constitutes the only guideline for investigative commissions. The circular gives, for 
example, guidelines on procedures for appointments of members to the investigative 
commissions and for the procedure of investigation. The preference for regulating 
these questions in a circular instead of by law was motivated by the fact that judicial 
regulation could imply a too high degree of institutionalization of the investigative 
commissions.47
In general we can establish that, after the Kings Bay accident in 1962, accident
investigations have successively been separated from the traditional ad hoc organized
committees. We will now turn to the establishment of permanent accident investigation
boards.
The first permanent accident investigation board in 1989
Precisely as in Sweden – and in accordance with international obligations – the 
Norwegians established ad hoc special commissions to investigate aircraft accidents. 
The members of those commissions were appointed by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. The police participated in the ad hoc commissions. But already from 
1948–49 the police withdrew from these commissions. From then on the police and the 
commissions conducted separate accident investigations. As a matter of standard 
procedure the reports on accidents had as their main aim to ‘prevent similar 
accidents in the future’. These commissions were often criticized for being too close to 
the aviation industry since their members were experts who were in many cases 
recruited from the aviation industry. One result of this criticism was the appointment 
of a permanent com-mission for aircraft accidents in 1956. Its mandate was to 
investigate questions of guilt and responsibility, but not to consider possible 
penalties.48
In the middle of the 1970s the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
(Flyhavarikommisjonen) got a more permanent character by the establishment of a sec-
retariat headed by a permanently employed leader. This was the somewhat meagre
result of a discussion of several possible organizational solutions that were presented
in a proposition on how to organize accident investigations. We can use that proposition
here to study what potential organizational solutions one envisaged in Norway at this
time. One alternative was that the Aviation Directorate (Luftfartsdirektoratet) conducted
all aircraft accident investigations. Another alternative was that the police should be in
charge of all such investigation. Further on one could consider the establishment of a
special court, or a combined commission for civil as well as military aircraft accidents.
And finally, as one alternative, already in this proposition, a multi-modal investigation
board for all accidents was discussed.49 However, it is interesting to note that the modest
organizational result of rather great ambitions to solve a broad variety of problems was
a secretariat with only one employee.
Not until 1989 was the first permanent accident investigative commission for civil
aviation appointed in Norway.50 The Accident Investigation Board for Civil Aviation
(Havarikommisjonen for sivil luftfart, HSL) worked on the basis of the aviation legislation
and of international conventions and rules for investigation of aircraft accidents. The aim
of the board was to prevent future accidents, but not to assign guilt or responsibility for
the accident in question. The reports from the board had to be public, but the board
was not authorized to present concrete proposals on suitable changes.51 Furthermore
the new accident board was not obliged to report on its discoveries to the police or to
the prosecuting authority.52
The long road towards a multi-modal accident investigation board
Already a couple of years after the establishment of the first permanent accident inves-
tigation board in 1989, proposals for the establishment of a unified commission for the
transportation sector were discussed.53 In the aftermath of a train accident at Kolbotn
in the Oslo area in May 1985, the Norwegian State Railways (Norges Statsbaner, NSB)
raised the question whether there was a need for a general commission for investigat-
ing major accidents within land-based transportation as ‘there will be increased risk
for serious accidents in a modern high-technological society’. Against this background
an internal report was written in the Ministry of Transport and Communications on
the need for a commission to investigate so-called ‘major accidents’ in order to pre-
vent future accidents. The advantage, it was emphasised, by an external commission
was that it could maintain ‘complete objectivity’ and would represent continuity and
accumulate experience. It was economically rational to institutionalize one central com-
mission instead of many specialized ones. The counterargument was that accidents are
so diverse in nature that different kinds of expertises are necessary to investigate them.
Considering the wide range of accidents to be investigated, several special commissions
were more effective than one central commission, the report claimed. The Norwegian
Civil Aviation Administration (Luftfartsverket) maintained that the idea of one, common
accident commission was not in the interest of aviation. The Norwegian State Railways
was, as mentioned, positive to the idea of one common commission, but on the condi-
tion that the principle of common investigation would not eliminate the need for internal
commissions. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration (Vegdirektoratet) opposed the
establishment of commissions on a permanent basis. They had already implemented test
arrangements for investigating road accidents, but their conclusion after these tests had
been conducted was that they did ‘not contribute to obtaining new knowledge on why
accidents happen’. The research institute SINTEF even introduced the new idea that the
researchers must participate in accident investigations. The Ministry of Justice and the
Police supported the claim on research representation in its hearing report. On the other
hand the ministry preferred not to terminate the existing commissions. The Ministry of
Transport and Communications concluded its hearing report by stating that the ministry
did not support the idea of one common commission for the transportation sector only,
at least not until further studies had been carried out. And if one included in the concept
‘major accident’ (storulykke) even fires and explosions and first and foremost accidents
connected to the petroleum industry, the Ministry of Transport and Communications
considered the further study of the future organization of accident investigation to be a
question for the Ministry of Justice and the Police to deal with.54
It was a conservative government which in 1991 gave the Ministry of Justice and 
the Police an open mandate in its further study of the accident investigation question. 
Two years later, in 1993, and at that time the country was led by a Social Democratic 
government, the ministry answered short and concisely that its impression was that 
the current organization functioned well: ‘We cannot see that a possible major acci-
dent commission [storulykkeskommisjon] would replace any of them. In general we think 
that one should not continue in the direction of an essential extension of the objects 
for investigations in commissions’. The ministry furthermore underlined the 
importance of ‘expert knowledge’ (spisskompetanse) in the accident investigation 
boards and the demand for such competence would vary heavily from accident to 
accident. The ministry intimated that it was still doubtful about the idea of a common 
commission. If all imaginable accidents should be investigated in the same, permanent 
commission, the ministry warned, the committee had to be very large. The resources 
required would be greater than the results that one could expect to get in return. 
‘Major accidents of the same character are so rare that one will not ensure substantial 
continuity and experience’. Therefore there was, according to the Ministry of Justice 
and the Police, no need for one common ‘major accident commission’.55
The idea of a broad and permanent accident investigation board originated, as 
mentioned, in a governmental proposition in the mid-1970s. It can also be identified 
in a work from 1982 by one of the leading accident researchers in Norway, Jan Erik 
Vinnem. On the condition of continued independence from the industry in question, 
he claimed that Norway would gain by setting up an independent accident investigation 
board with the mandate of performing systematic investigation into the causes of 
accidents and with preventative aim.56 Even the Norwegian Technical-Scientific 
Research Council (Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd) concluded in a 
report on ‘major accidents’ in 1983 that there had been ‘developed a better and 
more detailed methodology for the analysis of risks’.57
The concept and the consciousness of interdependences in risk analysis was in other
words both articulated and formulated in academic circles. But then, as we have seen,
the idea was dropped by the Ministry of Justice and the Police in 1993.
Towards the idea of multi-modal accident investigation boards
In 1999, the Maritime Law Commission (Sjølovskomitéen) declared that the traditional 
maritime accident inquiry did not meet the requirements of contemporary maritime 
security. The answer to the new needs was the establishment of a permanent 
investigating board for maritime accidents. This new board ought to be permanently 
staffed.
This initiative from the Maritime Law Commission turned out to possess heavy 
definition power. It was to be referred to in several reports. The proposal for a 
martime accident investigation board is all the more surprising – as well as 
interesting –as the Maritime Law Commission was clearly aware of the fact that 
their suggestion goes beyond the mandate for its report. But in a passage in its 
report it took up the Finnish and the Swedish model with one common board for 
all major accidents and concluded by declaring it to be the best solution ‘in the long 
term’. The commission stated that its members realized that its recommendation, if 
followed, would imply a ‘radical infringement’ on the traditional methods of 
dealing with accident investigation in Norway, and it predicted that a transition to 
such a system would become ‘time consuming and to some extent complicated’ to 
implement. The Maritime Law Commission member, Karin M. Bruzelius,58 
permanent undersecretary in the Ministry of Transport and Communication during the 
last half of the 1980s when that ministry in the earlier mentioned internal report 
discussed ‘investigative committees for large scale accidents’, now again called attention 
to the necessary similarities with the already existing Accident Investigation Board for 
Civil Aviation. Bruzelius thought that an accident investigation board could make a 
better effort to increase the level of transport security and simultaneously optimize 
the existing resources.59 These few examples from the archival material show that the 
idea of a common accident investigation board survived all efforts to eliminate it and 
how that happened.
In 2000 the government report, A Vulnerable Society (Sårbarhetsutredningen: Et
sårbart samfunn), which took a superior and comprehensive approach to questions on risk
and security in the Norwegian society, was published. The experts behind that report
recommended that a common and permanent accident investigation board would be
established, composed of highly qualified members who were thoroughly competent on
investigation methodology and who could use their individual competence to accumu-
late higher competence individually and collectively. If so needed, it was recommended
that there must be a possibility for this committee to strengthen its list of members
by external experts with relevant special skills. In this formative report there is clear
reference to those recommendations that had been formulated by the Maritime Law
Committee the preceding year. Furthermore the Vulnerable Society report confirmed the
continued potentiality for learning from those accidents that occur. The difficulty lies in
the problems connected to ‘establishing a system for systematic and overall collection of
experiences in order to integrate such collections in the preventive efforts’. A Vulnerable
Society thus claims that the methodology for accident investigation still has potential for
improvement and that ‘there is much to be learnt across the various sectors’ as one
often finds similar problems, even on organizational matters and in connection with the
distribution of responsibility.60
It was not only in A Vulnerable Society that the organization of accidental investigation
was discussed during 2000. In the National Transportation Plan (Nasjonal transportplan)
for the period 2002–11,61 which probably is publicly best known for launching the so-
called ‘zero vision’ concerning road accidents: ‘a vision that no accident should occur
where persons were killed or suffered lifelong injuries’, established that it was impor-
tant to separate accident investigation and police investigation. In 2000, the Accident
Investigation Board for Civil Aviation was still the only Norwegian permanent and
independent investigative commission. Regional analysis groups had been established
for road traffic accidents. The railway sector had its own, internal commissions that
did not report on their work to the public. On the background of serious and major 
accidents – the Sleipner shipwreck in November 1999 (16 dead) and the Åsta railway 
accidents in early January 2000 (19 dead) – the first measure was to link air and railway 
in one common accident commission. The Social Democratic government now opened 
the gate for the possibility to establish a multi-modal accident investigation board. But 
the government hesitated to make the next step, and came to a halt by proposing an 
accident investigation board for railway and aircraft accidents and indicated that an 
accident commission for investigation of all transport accidents would be established in 
the future.62 The leading conservative parties, the Progressive Party, the Conservative 
Party and the Liberal Party (Fremskrittspartiet, Høyre and Venstre) wanted to establish 
directly a multi-modal accident investigation board.63
Simultaneously, however, an enlarged accident commission was being formed 
somewhere else. A permanent investigative authority for the railway sector was 
discussed in connection with the proposal for a new legislation for the railway system 
in 1993. At that time the idea was that the funds needed for establishing a permanent 
commission were too large considering the few accidents that occurred in the railway 
sector. One huge change in the accident pattern would change this attitude to the 
potential benefits connected to the costs of a permanent accident apparatus. The 
Åsta railway accident in 2000 contributed to the changed position. Suddenly and 
resolutely after that acci-dent and without awaiting any new report on the reasons 
behind it or the consequences of that particular accident, the Social Democratic 
government now wanted to let the railway accident investigations merge into a 
permanent commission by extending the mandate for the Accident Investigation 
Board for Civil Aviation and to bring experts with railway competence into this 
board. This new board became operational in the summer of 2002 with the name the 
Accident Investigation Board for Civil Aviation and Railways (Havarikommisjon for sivil 
luftfart og jernbane).64
Already a year after the Åsta accident – in the summer of 2001 – the Social
Democratic government started contemplating whether one should now establish a
multi-modal board for accident investigations. The choice was between either major
transportation accidents or major accidents in general. This was an idea that stemmed
from the political think-tanks during these years, which planned for a reorganization
of the entire public sector. In other words this initiative did not primarily originate
from assessments on accident investigation methodology or risk and security analysis
in society. The former conservative coalition government had proposed the same as
a follow-up of the A Vulnerable Society report.65 When a new conservative coalition
government took office during the autumn of 2001 its programme, negotiated between
the cooperative parties in the government, contained one point on ‘having one board
for investigating accidents in different transport sectors’.66
At the entrance to the 21st century the idea of establishing a multi-modal board for
accident investigations had matured to political consensus.
The winding road to a common commission for accidents
In the 2002 ‘Report on the establishment of a common board for accidents’67 the
knowledge from, and follow-up of, safety advice after accidents were emphasized as
the central tasks for a new board for accident investigation. In this report, Bruzelius’
contribution from 1999 was referred to, as the idea of establishing one permanent 
organization was seen as a central element of the argument for supporting a 
multimodal accident investigation board. The question was now whether the 
commission should be incorporated in an existing but enlarged commission or 
whether a new commission would be formed. There were possible economic synergy 
effects. Instead of a commission for the investigation of maritime accidents there were 
good arguments for the idea that ‘the investigation of maritime accidents [could] be 
done in a broader circle of professional technical competence on accidents and 
causality in general’.68 The same kind of motivation was given for arguing that the 
quality of maritime accident investigations should increase in a ‘broader professional 
environment which possessed high expertise in the areas of accident evaluations and 
questions of causes’.69 One of the benefits that followed from a broad organization was 
that the methodological and human factors came first by designing the investigations in 
such a way that they could contribute to the learning process to prevent accidents – 
and to the clearer and more reliable identification of the recipients of the security 
recommendations that the committee was obliged to deliver.70
Even if the authors of the report claimed that the efficiency of the existing small 
organs could evaporate, the conclusion was that a wider commission for the 
investigation of accidents ought to be established. The authors conclude by 
recommending a commission for accident investigations for the entire transport sector, 
but not a general major accident commission. When several members have a combined 
major experience from the transport sector, one can make use of resources that 
account for ‘such objects and matters as underlying causes for accidents, investigative 
methodology, human factors – even if it might be difficult to state exactly the degree of 
influence of such factors to the cause of the accident in question’.71
The report put, as we have seen, road traffic in a separate category. The reason was 
certainly not that there were too few accidents on the roads, but the accident pattern 
deviated sharply from other accidents. Therefore the authors of the report demanded a 
special report on the road traffic carried out by ‘a group of people who have their 
competence from road issues and investigative methodology’. In contrast to earlier 
reports, it now seemed to be an advantage that the road sector was involved since that 
involvement would imply enhanced competence. Conversely, there were obviously 
good reasons for a new and strengthened commission for the investigation of road 
accidents due to the high number of casualties on the roads. The question was which 
traffic accidents were to be investigated and which were not.72
The question of the enlargement of the board to also investigate road accidents
was treated by a separate workgroup.73 Their opinion was that if investigation of road
accidents were to be included in the tasks of the new common commission for accidents,
one had to select what kind of accidents to treat in the commission and which road
accidents should be excluded from the commission’s actions. The workgroup wrote that
a narrow demarcation between them would be useful. The road accidents suitable for
the commission’s investigations were such traffic situations that had a high risk potential
and where the commission investigation could enhance security. It was emphasized that
the selection process must aim at such cases to be included in the investigations that
they could contribute to ‘the accumulation of such knowledge that road authorities did
not already have, and that it must be possible to follow up such know-how by adequate
measures’.74
One result of this process was the establishment of the Accident Investigation Board
Norway (Statens havarikommisjon for transport) in 2005 with a mandate that even included
serious incidents in road traffic, air transport and by railway.
Finally, from 1 July 2008, also maritime accidents were included in the mandate 
for the Accident Investigation Board Norway. The aim of the operation is to increase 
security. Questions of guilt and juridical responsibility must be put aside. All participat-
ing parties in the investigation process have the duty to give all pertinent information 
they might have to the commission – irrespective of obligations of confidentiality. 
Last but not least, the report after any accident must contain a review of the causes 
and recommendations for measures to be implemented to prevent new accidents of 
the same kind.75
In his book on investigations, Johan Giertsen has identified three hallmarks in
the new Norwegian multi-modal accident investigation board: independence, since the
board cannot be instructed by those organs or institutions that compile or decide rules
or routines that might be a matter for investigations; the board’s mandate implies a
duty to investigate the course of events and even the causal factors; and the board
has the responsibility to investigate circumstances that can prevent new accidents. The
Accident Investigation Board Norway has no responsibility for the implementations of
their recommendations.76
Conclusion
Clearly throughout the late 20th century any kind of accident investigation model was
meant to have a didactic function; to make institutions learn from accidents in order to
avoid repetitions of similar types of accident. The doctrine of increasing the learning by
reforms has been repeated in the Swedish as well as the Norwegian sources over and
over again. But how it could be done has not been clear and articulated. It remains to
reflect on the question whether these re-organizations towards permanent multi-modal
accident investigations boards have contributed to learning and if, by such learning, our
societies have become more secure.
The attempt to identify descriptions of societal changes and to find out how they can 
be tied to efforts for altering the accident investigation boards showed that the 
descriptions of what we often call the ‘risk society’ have not changed significantly. 
Surprisingly enough the descriptions and characteristics of a society with risks and 
perils seem to have been stable since the 1970s.
An important difference between Sweden and Norway is that the objectivity criteria, 
as, for example, the independence from safety controlling authorities, have been more 
central in the Swedish discourse. A corresponding central concept in the Norwegian 
discourse is legal security (rettssikkerhet) that opens for emphasizing the rights and 
protection for individuals in investigating processes.
There is an apparent difference in the chronology between the two countries.
Norway had its first permanent, but specialized, investigating board for aviation at the
same time as Sweden established a broad multi-modal accident investigating board for all
major accidents. The fact that it would take almost another two decades before Norway
established a new multi-modal accident investigating board – though only for the trans-
portation sector – cannot be given a clear explanation. The very lengthy process towards
a joint accident investigating board for the whole transport sector is an interesting factor
in the Norwegian development. We can trace the idea more than a quarter of a century
earlier in a parliamentary bill of one board ‘investigating all major traffic accidents – as
well with car, as with railway, ship or aeroplane’.77 But some plausible explanations for
the discrepancy in time between the two Scandinavian countries can be suggested.
Norway has a long tradition for appointing ad hoc investigative commissions as an 
alternative to permanent accident investigations. That tradition has not been strong 
in Sweden. Instead the Swedish society has an ‘old’ state tradition for internal state 
investigations with independent investigating institutions as the Parliament Standing 
Committee on the Constitution (Konstitutionsutskottet), the Ombudsman for Justice 
(Justitieombudsmannen), the Chancellor for Justice (Justitiekanslern) and in general the 
committee service has served the tasks connected to disaster investigations.78 In a 
Norwegian report on governmental investigative commission reports it was claimed 
that in Sweden one can find a higher degree of trust in the internal state 
investigaion establishment, consequently there are fewer discussions on the findings 
of these reports than on equivalent reports in Norway.79 A concept like ‘civil servant 
honesty’ (ämbetsmannaheder), with its deep roots closely connected to Swedish state 
administration, might have contributed to the development of this confidence. In a 
younger state, like Norway, the possibilities to build up long traditions for a state 
administration have been weaker. For example, when the governmental investigative 
commission reports in the mid-1970s were to be formalized, it was important not to 
institutionalize the work on governmental investigative commission reports.
Correspondence between changing accident investigating organizations and changes
in images of the risk society were not dealt with. The same is also apparent when
we come to references for changing investigation methods or contemporary risk and
safety research. The lack of pointing at research, method development or system
understanding of accidents has been most apparent in the Swedish development.
In this connection the hypothesis that unique major accidents had an important 
impact on political decisions could also contribute to explaining the chronological 
discrepancy between Norway and Sweden. One explanation is that political changes 
occur as reactions to acute situations, rather than as well-planned and well-thought-out 
reforms. Thus we could claim that major and acute accidents, rather than 
accident understanding, trigger action and constitute formative periods when 
organizational changes become possible.
In fact, at one point we can explicitly find an accident that is claimed to play an
important role for a political decision, when, in 1981, the State Catastrophe Board, is
established in Sweden. The nowadays more or less forgotten fire catastrophe in Borås can
be directly connected to this initiative. The next formative period is 1986–89. In 1986
both SHK and the State Catastrophe Board had argued for their continuation as two
separate organizations. Then, after some years of silence, the Social Democratic govern-
ment suddenly placed a bill in parliament proposing a multi-modal accident investigation
board and even instituted new legislation. Sweden had changed after some unique events
in 1986 (Olof Palme, Chernobyl) and 1988 (Måbødalsolyckan), and those events proba-
bly brought a new understanding of the consequences and the extensiveness of accidents.
Two of the events even happened outside the country, but affected the whole Swedish
nation both physically as well as mentally and permeated the entire society. The Swedish
society had proven to have had difficulties with handling them and to be prepared for
what followed from them. The fact that Sweden had nuclear power plants in operation
probably strengthened the risk perception. There are good reasons for presuming that
the understanding of accidents and traumas was changing under the experiences from
the scenario here described. In Sweden one learnt to understand accidents as something
that could hurt society broadly and hard. It no longer gave any meaning to uphold an
organization of separate and specialized accident investigating boards.
Holding on to the hypothesis of accidents as triggers for political decisions, one can
observe that the first permanent accident investigating board was established in Norway
in 1989 and was preceded by two major flight accidents; at the Torghatten (36 dead)
and the aircraft accident with a Partnair flight (55 dead) off the Danish coast. But the
year 2000 has to be considered as the turning point for Norway, when at last a report
proposed the establishment of a multi-modal accident investigation board for the trans-
port sector, even if it did not handle all major accidents. As we have demonstrated the
idea had lived its own life through many reports from the mid-1970s. After 2000 the
decisions came in rapid succession. This change in pace can be connected to the Åsta
railway accident (2000) and the loss of the fast boat Sleipner (1999) on the Norwegian
west coast, though it is not mentioned in the sources.
These explanations clearly show the societal embedment of these reforms. Further, 
one might rule out the traditional but loosely motivated understanding that Norway 
always follows Sweden, and thereby indicating that the Swedish state is more 
modern. This may instead indicate that Norway has not followed Sweden because nearly 
two decades is too long a time for claiming that one has ‘slackened a bit in 
modernization’.
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